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I. INTRODUCTION
The detention of juveniles prior to adjudication or disposition of their cases
represents one of the most serious problems in the administration of juvenile
justice. The problem is characterized by the very large number of juveniles
incarcerated during this stage annually, the harsh conditions under which
they are held, the high costs of such detention, and the harmful after-effects
detention produces'.
The extent of juvenile interim 2 detention and its social and economic
costs are well documented.3  National estimates of the number of children
detained each year in an interim status range as high as 500,000.4 In Ohio
the number of juveniles retained prior to disposition rose from 10,405 in
1973 to 15,620 in 1975. 5  Unsuitable, often deplorable, conditions of
detention contribute to the urgency of the problem.6
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law.
1. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JtIVLNILU
JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STArt S (Tent. Draft 1977) (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter cited as IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS].
2. In this article the term "interim detention" refers to periods or detention: (1) after arrest and
before trial, (2) after trial and before final disposition, or (3) after the disposition hearing and before
implementation of disposition. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, slpra note i. at 4.
"Interim period" is defined by the Institute of Judicial Administratioui-American Bar Association
Joint Commission onJuvenile Justice Standards as "[t]he interval between the arrest or summons of an
accused juvenile charged with a criminal offense and the implementation of a finaljudicial disposition,
The term 'interim' is used as an adjective referring to this interval, e.g. 'interim status,'
'interim liberty,' and 'interim detention.'" Id. STANDARD 2.1.
3. See generally sources cited in IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 1, at 1-2
nn.l-4. See also R. GOLDFARB, JAILS 286-344 (1975); Sarri, The Detention of Youth in Jails and
Juvenile Detention Facilities, 24 JUv. JUST. 2 (1973).
4. R. SARRI, UNDER LOCK AND KEY: JUVENILES IN JAILS AND DETENTION 5 (1974),
5. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, OHIO DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND RETARDATION, 01110
JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS (1973-1975).
6.
Although a great many states have laws specifically forbidding tl-e jailing of children with
adult offenders, nearly 90% of all juvenile court jurisdictions, particularly those in non-
metropolitan areas, are too small to warrant detention facilities for children. . . . As a
result, children are detained in old-age homes, insane asylums, courthouses, or often in one or
two cells of the local jail.
. . . The so-called separate facilities in jail often turn out to be a bunk . . . within
hearing if not sight of adult criminals.
D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964, at 105 (1964).
In 1974 only Arizona, California. Connecticut, Indiana and Maryland absolutely forbad juveniles
to be detained in adult jails. M. LEONARD & R. SARRI, JUVENILE DELINQUENCy: A COMPARATIVU
ANALYSIS OF LEGAL CODES IN THE UNITED STATES 32 (1974).
In Ohio.
[a] child may be detained in jail or other facility [sic] for detention of adults only if [juvenile
detention facilities are] not available and the detention is in a room separate and removed
from those for adults. The court may order that a child over the age of fifteen years be
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In 1976, Ohio Attorney General William J. Brown responded to the
chaotic state7 of Ohio's juvenile justice system by appointing a Citizens'
Task Force to recommend corrective action. As a direct result of the
efforts of the Task Force, House Bill 460 was introduced into the 112th
Ohio General Assembly in 1977. The bill, which has been passed by the
House in amended form8 and which now awaits Senate action, would
substantially revise juvenile procedures for the state. Some of the more
costly and controversial provisions of the legislation address the nature
and conditions of juvenile detention facilities.9 Although passage of the
bill would also affect interim detention procedures,u amendment or
additional legislation would be required to relieve the unfairness and
arbitrariness of Ohio's present system for deciding which juveniles need
interim detention.
This article will assess traditional and contemporary views of criteria
for imposing interim detention and will discuss the intimately related issue
of juvenile bail. It will then propose an alternative new model to guide
judicial imposition of interim detention in Ohio and elsewhere.
II. CRITERIA FOR THE DECISION TO DETAIN
The history of juvenile law helps to explfin the conflicting goals that
beset our modern juvenile system. The American juvenile courts were
detained in ajail in a room separate and removed from adults if public safety and protection
reasonably require such detention.
The official in charge of a jail or other facility for the detention of adult offenders or
persons charged with crime shall inform the court immediately when a child, who is or
appears to be under the age of eighteen years, is received at the facility, and shall deliver him
to the court upon request, or transfer him to a detention facility designated by the court.
OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.312(A) (Page 1976). The fact that 56 of Ohio's 88 counties lack separate
juvenile detention facilities other than designated areas in adult jails undoubtedly contributes to the
"blatant violations ofjuvenile rights in most counties and intentional or unintentional violations of the
law regarding the separation of adults and children." [OHto] ATTORNEY GENERAL's JuvENLE JuSTICE
TASK FORCE, JUSTICE FOR OUR CHILDREN 50 (1976) [hereinafter cited as OioTAsK FORCE RPORT].
Exploitation, homosexual rape, and suicide are consequences of commingling adults and ju-
veniles in detention. See Robinson, What to Do If Your Child Is Arrested, 103 READER'S DiGE T 167,
167-68(1973). People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482,220 N.W.2d212(1974), reversed theconviction
of a teenager for escape from an adult prison. Testimony revealed that he had twice been beaten by
adult gangs for refusal to engage in homosexual activity. At least one court has held that jailing
children with adults violates due process. Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974).
7. OHIO TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.
8. Sub. H.B. 460, 112th Ohio Gen. Ass. (1978).
9. In response to the intense criticism of the practice of commingling children with adults in
detention facilities, discussed at note 6 supra, Sub. H.B. 460 would amend existing Ohio law to
proscribe placement of juveniles in adultjails. Although the bill stops short of forbidding adults and
juveniles to be housed under one roof, it imposes segregation sufficiently strict that
it is impossible for the child to come into contact with or converse with the adults in the
building, and the children who are detained in the building do not use hallways, sanitary,
eating, or recreational facilities, or any other auxiliary facilities at the same time they are
being used by the adults who are detained in the building.
Sub. H.B. 460, supra note 8, § 2151.15(C).
The bill also directs immediate transfer of a child mistakenly placed in an adult facility; absent
transfer the charges must be dismissed, although the child may be recharged. Id. § 2151.13(B).
10. See text accompanying notes 53-57 infra.
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founded at the turn of this century1 as a response to social conditions of
the Industrial Revolution 12 in the belief that courts, with their inherent
equity powers, could and should have broad discretion to act in the best
interests of the child.13  The common-law concept of parens patriae1
4
became the courts' guiding principle. As a natural outgrowth of this
doctrine of "supreme guardianship," the courts came to view their power
as extending to the physical custody of the child.' 5 Tension has arisen in
the system, however, because landmark decisions, notably Kent v. United
States16 and In re Gault,17 have forced the states to afford constitutional
due process and equal protection to juveniles in custody.
This author proceeds from the premise, shared by prominent critics of
contemporary predisposition detention procedures, that "the danger of
11. Illinois adopted the first Juvenile Court Act. Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 Il1, Laws 131.
The Illinois Juvenile Court Aci [included] most of the featurcs that have since come
to distinguish the juvenile court. The original act and the amerdments to it that shortly
followed brought together under one jurisdiction cases of dependency, neglect and delin-
quency-the last comprehending incorrigibles and children threatened by immoral asso-
ciations as well as criminal lawbreakers. Hearings were to be informal and nonpublic,
records confidential, children detain- apart from adults, and a probation staff appointed.
In short, children were not to be treated as criminals nor dealt with by the processes used for
criminals.
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCa
REPORT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 3 (1967) (hereinafter cited PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE REPORT].
12.
Both industrialization and immigration were bringing people into cities by the thousands,
with resulting overcrowding, disruption of family life, increase in vice and crime, and all the
other destructive factors characteristic of rapid urbanization. Truancy and delinquency rose
rapidly, and civic-minded men and women worried about the exposure of children to
tobacco, alcohol, pornography, and strict life in general. . . . [T]hroughout the 19th
century there was a rising concern about official treatment of children-the growth of what
has been called the spirit of social justice. The social sciences . . . seemed to provide the
ideal tool for implementing. Lhe dual goals of treating wayward children and offsetting their
deleterious surroundings.
Id. at 2-3.
13. Although European and American children were often treated as harshly as adults well into
the nineteenth century, special treatment for children had its origins in the early English equity courts,
Under the doctrine of inquisitio post mortem, the Crown assumed the parental role in administering
deceased children's estates. H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THlE UNITED STATES 3, 13-14 (1927). After
the abolition of the Court of Wards in 1600, the Court of Chancery assumed the duty of protection of
all infants. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *426-28. This early jurisdiction extended only to
matters traditionally civil in nature; at common law a child of seven was presumed incompetent to
commit a crime. Jurisdiction to act in the best interest of children accused of acts that would constitute
adult crime seems to stem from a marriage of equity and criminal law principles. The fact that courts
of criminal jurisdiction were unable to deal effectively with young children undoubtedly contributed to
the attractiveness of separate children's courts.
14. Parenspatriae literally means "father of his country" or "parent of the country." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1269 (14th ed. 1968). The doctrine was set forth in Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 Peere
Williams 103 (1772):
The care of all infants is lodged in the king as parens patriae, and by the king this care is
delegated to his Court of Chancery. . . .Idiots and lunatics, who are incapable to take care
of themselves, are provided for by the king as parens patriae; and there is some reason to
extend this care to infants.
15. H. Lou, supra note 13, at 8.
16. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
17. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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too much detention before trial or disposition currently outweighs the
danger-both for juveniles and society-of too much release.' 8  The
numbers and characteristics ofjuveniles detained are determined by police
and juvenile court criteria for deciding which children are to be held.
Fairness, both as a matter of constitutional due process and social policy,
would seem to demand that the criteria be specific and consistently
applied. Nevertheless, in 1976, sixteen states 9 had no meaningful
standards for detention but left the determination entirely to the unguided
discretion of the juvenile judge.20 More commonly, state statutes,
including Ohio's,2' list one or more very general classes of juveniles for
whom interim detention may be required: 22 (1) children who present a risk
of harm to themselves or others; (2) children who present a risk of
absconding from the jurisdiction; and (3) children who lack parental
supervision.
There is general agreement that children who threaten to abscond or
who lack parental supervision may appropriately be detained, 23 although
18. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 1, at3. See also D. FREEa & P. \VALD,
supra note 6, at 93-109, 111.
19. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wash-
ington. McDiarmid, Juvenile Pre-Trial Detention, 34 NAe'L LEGAL AID AND DErEDEIs'
ASS'N BRIEFCASE 77, 78 (1976).
20.
If the criteria [that the judge uses to make his detention determination] are loose enough to
permit him to interpose subjective judgments about the child's best interests, or his own
predictions about possible danger to the community, the results are bound to vary with the
judge's philosophic disposition and will be unpredictable on a jurisdiction-wide basis.
Wald, Pretrial Detention for Juveniles, in PURSUING JUsTIcE FOR TlE CHILD 121, 121-22 (M.
Rosenheim ed. 1976).
21. The Ohio statute provides, in part, that
[a] child taken into custody shall not be detained or placed in shelter care prior to hearing or
conmplaint unless his detention orcare is required to protect the person and property of others
or those of the child, or because the child may abscond or be removed from thejurisdiction of
the court, or because he has no parent or guardian or custodian or other persons able to
provide supervision and care for him and return him to the court when required or because an
order for his detention or shelter care has been made by the court pursuant to this chapter.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.31(D) (Page 1976). This section was enacted in 1969 at the urging of
Ohio juvenile authorities such as Judge Whitlatch, who has written that Ohio's previous informal
policy of interim release if the child was not likely to abscond or endanger "was subject to the
interpretation of so many individuals that it was never intelligently implemented. In practice, children
were admitted to the detention home upon the request of social workers, intake personnel, probation
officers, police officers, school officials and parents without any well-defined criteria for admissions."
Whitlatch, Practical Aspects of Reducing Detention Home Population, 24 Juv. JUsT. 17, 21 (1973).
Juvenile Rule 7(A), adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in 1972 without disapproval by the Ohio
General Assembly, is worded identically to Ohio Revised Code § 2151.3 I(D) except that the Rule omits
the concluding phrase of the statute "because an order for his detention or shelter care has been made
by the court pursuant to this chapter." The Ohio Constitution provides that "(a]ll laws in conflict with
[thejuvenile] rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." OHiO COSsr.
art IV, §5(B). It is therefore arguable that detention cannot be imposed by the Ohiojuven.le courts for
any reason not explicitly stated in Juvenile Rule 7(A).
22. Ohio and several other states allow detention of a child otherwise undetainable under the
statutory criteria, if there is no parent, guardian, or relative able to assure custody. McDiarmid,supra
note 19, at 78.
23. Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, Juvenile D.tention: Protection, Prevention or Pu.nlshment?
38 FORDHAM L. REV. 161, 164 (1969).
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most jurisdictions do not provide suitably specific guidelines to indicate
the conditions under which a court is to order detention on either or both
of these two grounds.24 The widespread practice of detaining children
who allegedly present a risk of harm is, however, open to serious question.
A. Preventive Detention: Practical Objections
The risk that a child charged with a delinquent act poses to himself,
the community, or both, has been accepted as ajustifiable basis for interim
detention. 25  There is, nevertheless, a shocking lack of data to support the
belief that the judicial system can adequately identify those children who
pose a real threat of danger and still avoid incarcerating those who do
not.26
Given the detrimental effects of detention, it would be unconscionable
to set an overinclusive standard. The emotional consequences of
detention include insecurity, assumption of the p:sychological role of
prisoner,2' and suicidal inclination.28  Detained children are subject to
physical and sexual abuse by their peers. 29  Trial and subsequent
disposition are often seriously prejudiced by interim detention.30
There have been few attempts at identifying specific dangerous acts
24. See Wald, supra note 20, at 123.
25. See, e.g., H. Lou, supra note 13, at 106; McDiarmid, supra note 19. For a history of the
origin of the concept of preventive detention, see R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM 127-49 (1965).
26.
There is no responsible evidence to indicate that we know how to predict dangerous or violent
behavior in ajuvenile any more than we do in an adult. Yetjuvenile courts have operated on
the premise that they are authorized to detain for possible future criminal behavior.
Typically, the kind of illegal behavior that warrants detention is not even specified; it could be
any offense, from murder to marijuana. What few statistics we have show that only a small
majority of juveniles in detention are charged with serious crimes involving violence to the
person of others.
Wald, supra note 20, at 124.
27. Komisaruk, Psychiatric Issues in the Incarceration of Juveniles, 21 Juv. CouRT JuDOES J.'
117, 118 (1971).
28. See R. GOLDFARB, supra note 25, at 301.
29. See Note, Detention Procedures in the Juvenile Court Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 409,416
(1969).
30. From his experience in court, a California public defender has determined that
the minor who comes to court in custody receives harsher treatrent at disposition (the
sentencing stage) than does the minor who remains out of custody. Judges are less likely to
order great changes in family structure when the minor comes to court with his family. The
presence of the family is an indication that a community-oriented placement is presently
working and should be continued. The likelihood of separation frora the family is increased
when the minor is in custody and has, therefore, been away from hi3 family for some time.
After all, he is used to being confined, and the family expectations are lower.
Edwards, The Rights of Children, 37 FED. PnoB. 34 (1973).
The case of Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970) illustrates another important aspect of
this problem. A seventeen-year old black youth was held following a fight at school, Defendant's
white attorney required his client's assistance to locate crucial witnesses and to assure their
cooperation. The district court denied the youth's request for release. The Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that under the specific circumstances due process demanded that the accused be released to
participate in the preparation of his own defense.
[Vol. 39:306
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that constitute a threat to the child or the community.3t The most serious
problem created by the use of the "dangerousness" standard is that it is
virtually impossible, as an evidentiary matter, to prove a child's future
potential for engaging in harmful conduct. The child's attitude is too
subjective a criterion. 2 Nor does the criterion of the child's past conduct
provide a reliable measure of future behavior. 33  The "past conduct"
criterion is often invoked, however, despite the lack of empirical studies to
support it.
34
Courts usually allow the seriousness of the offense to determine or
strongly influence whether a child should be detained pending final
disposition,3" although it has long been observed that those who are
charged with the most serious offenses may not pose a future threat to the
36community. A major study by the American Bar Foundation of the
effectiveness of adult pretrial preventive detention concluded that
although the seriousness of the offense does to some degree identify
subsequent recidivism, "the accuracy is not substantial." 37  Apparently
no similar study has been made of juvenile interim detainees. There is,
however, no reason to believe that the future conduct of juveniles can be
predicted with greater certainty than the future conduct of adults3 s
B. Preventive Detention: The Equal Protection Problem
Future harm is not only an unreliable criterion for interim detention
of juveniles; it is constitutionally questionable when there is no
corresponding basis for detention of adults. In Peopleexrel. Wayburn v.
Schupf3 9 the alleged delinquent, accused of acts which if committed by an
adult would have constituted murder in the second degree and
manslaughter in the first degree, was held without bail. New York, like
31. See Ferster, Snethen & Courtless. supra note 23. at 166.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 167.
34. See Wenk. Robison&Smith. Can Violencebe Predicted'?. 18CRIMEAND DELt'tWE-w'V 393.
398 (1972).
35.
The imposition of arbitrary detention rules results in the unnecessary detention of
many children. These rules are generally based on the seriousness of the alleged
offense; such offenses commonly are homicide, aggravated assault, armed robbery, rape
and possession of guns. Superficially, this appears to be a sound basis for detention.
Therefore, detention of children held under such a rule frequently goes unchallenged
by parents and counsel, and the screening process by staff ceases with the information
concerning the nature of the charge. The obvious invalidity of such a rule is that it
takes into consideration only one aspect of the screening process, albeit, an important
one.
Whitlatch. supra note 21. at 27. See also Ferster. Snethen & Courtless. supra note 23. at 167.
36. F. WARNER, JUVENILE DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 153 (1933).
37. American Bar Foundation, Prewvnth Detention: An Empirical Analsis. 6 HAirv. C.R.-
C.L. REv. 289. 323-24 (1971).
38. Wenk, Robison & Smith, supra note 34.
39. 80 Misc. 2d 730, 365 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974).
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Ohio.40 allows detention of juveniles when it is substantially probable that
they will not appear before the court for future hearings, or when there is a
serious risk that another offense may be committed 4' The family court
judge in Wavb urn specifically found that the juvenile, although likely to
return to court for future hearings, presented a serious risk to the
community because of the seriousness of the charge.
The alleged delinquent, Schupf, filed a petition for habeas corpus
alleging that the New York juvenile detention statute violated the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution because there existed
no similar authority to preventively detain a similarly-charged adult.
43
The New York Supreme Court sustained the petition, emphasizing that
"[t]he right at issue in this case is ihe most fundamental of all our rights-
the right to liberty.,4 4  The court observed that when legislation that
affects a fundamental right is challenged on equal protection grounds, the
enactment will be subjected to strict scrutiny; for the legislation to be
upheld, the state must show a compelling interest in maintaining the
classification. 45 The court concluded that because the effect and purpose
of preventive detention is the same for adults as it is forjuveniles,4 6 "[t]here
can be no compelling State interest in prohibiting preventive detention for
adults while allowing it for juveniles. '47  The Court of Appeals reversed,
agreeing with the lower court's application of strict scrutiny but finding a
compelling state interest.48 In an opinion concurring in result only Judge
Fuchsberg asserted that juvenile preventive detention fails to pass
constitutional muster because of the absence of any tools sufficient to make
accurate predictions of future conduct.
49
40. For the text of the Ohio Statute, see note 21 supra.
41.
(a) [T]he court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts and reasons for so
finding that unless the respondent is detained:
(i) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on the return date, or
(ii) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date do an act which ifcommitted by an
adult would constitute a crime.
FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 739 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1977-78).
42. 80 Misc. 2d at 732. 365 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
43. New York law forbids preventive detention of adults. NY. CRu51. PRoc. LAW § 510.30
(McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1977-78)).
44. 80 Misc. 2d at 733, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
45. Id. at 732, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 112.
46.
The effect of permitting pre-trial detention of juveniles is that they are incarcerated and
deprived of their liberty. The effect is identical on juveniles and adults. As M r. Justice
Black has written:
"Imprisonment awaiting determination of whether that imprisonment is justttiable his
precisely the same evil consequences to an individual whateser legalistic label is used to
describe his plight." (Carlson v. Landon. 342 U.S. 524. 557 . . . [dissent] [19521
Id. at 733, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
47. Id.
48. People ex rel Wayburn v. Schupf. 39 N.Y.2d 682. 689. 350 N.E.2d 906. 909-10, 385 NYS,
2d 518, 520 (1976),
49. Id. at 691-94, 350 N.E.2d at 911-13, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 522-24 (Fuchsberg. J., dissenting).
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Confusion associated with the constitutionality of preventive
detention of juveniles has been further compounded by the recent case of
Warren v. Wilson.50 In Wilson the family court of Onandaga, New York,
ruled that the Wayburn lower court finding that there was no compelling
state interest is still valid for juveniles over the age of sixteen.
Ohio's juvenile detention criteria pose the same constitutional
problems as those of New York. The parallel extends to the exposure of
juveniles over the age of fifteen to preventive detention 5' when they would
have an absolute right to bail if they had been charged as adults.52
C. Effect of Substitute House Bill 460 on Interim Detention
Although Substitute House Bill 460 would affect interim detention
primarily through restrictions it would impose on the use of particular
types of facilities,53 the bill would change existing detention criteria 4 in
one significant respect. Proposed section 2151.16(a)(5) would allow
Judge Fuchsberg concurred in the result only, on the ground ofmootness. During the pendency of
the appeal the juvenile had been adjudicated a delinquent and committed to a youth facility. The
majority recognized that the issue was moot for Schupf, but chose nevertheless to resolve the question.
Id. at 670, 350 N.E.2d at 910, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
50. 89 Misc. 2d 1046, 393 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Fain. Ct. Onandaga Cty. 1977).
51. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page 1976).
52. OHIo CoNst. art, I, § 9; OHIo R. CRIM. P. 46.
53. See note 9 supra.
54. In its present form the Ohio statute directs that "[a] child taken into custody shall not be
detained or placed in shelter care prior to hearing or complaint unless his detention or care is required
to protect the person or property of others or those of the child . . . ." Ohio REv. CODE A.N. §
2151.31(D) (Page 1976) (emphasis added). H.B. 460 as originally drafted appeared to disallow
juvenile placement in detention facilities in order to protect the person or property either ofthe child
himself or of others. H.B. 460, 112th Gen. Ass. §§ 2151.55(B)-(C), 2151.22(AXI). Such children
could, under the original draft, be placed in shelter care, defined as a physically unrestricted
(nonsecure) facility. Id.§2151.22(A)(l). The version of the bill debated in the House distinguished
detention, permissible only to protect the lerson or property of others, from shelter care, an available
option to protect the child's own person or property. It is problematic whether either version would
have improved on current law. Neither proposed specific standards to measure risk to a child's person
or property. Moreover, the degree of security at the holding facility is irrelevant to the fact that a child
has been removed involuntarily from his or her home to a potentially detrimental environment. See
notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
Prior to passage by the House, however, Sub. H.B. 460 was amended to restore essentially the
present statutory language:.
(A) A child taken into custody shall be released immediately to his parents, guardian,
or other custodian unless:
(1) Shelter care or detention is necessary to protect the person or property of the child
or other persons;
(2) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the child may abscond or be removed
from the jurisdiction of the court;
(3) An order for shelter care or detention has been made pursuant to this chapter,
(4) The child has no parent, guardian, custodian, or other person able to provide
supervision and care for him and return him to court when required;
(5) The child's parents, guardians, custodians, or other persons who are supervising
him refuse to execute a written promise to bring the child before the court when requested by
the court;
(6) The report required by division (C) of this section indicates that shelter care is
warranted for an alleged dependent child.
Sub. H.B. 460, 112th Ohio Gen. Ass. § 2151.16 (1978).
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predisposition detention of children whose parents or guardians refuse to
promise in writing to produce the child at future court hearings." This
would codify and strengthen the present informal juvenile court practice of
conditioning release on oral agreement of parents to guarantee ajuvenile's
future appearance.
The effect of this new provision would be to make the child's release
dependent on the whims of the parent rather than on an actual
determination of the likelihood that the child will pose a danger to himself
or others, or that he will fail to appear at future court dates. The parent is
often the last person to want the child released. When the parents
themselves have filed the delinquency charges, they cannot simultaneously
serve as prosecutor and protector. Even parents who have not brought
charges may feel that they can no longer cope with the child's behavior and
may view detention as relief from the pressures of parental responsibility.
Those harried parents may be reluctant to agree in writing to return the
child to the court, if by that agreement they lose what they see as their only
chance of a respite. That parental attitude is understandable, but hardly
consistent. with the generally accepted philosophy of detention.
Moreover, parents often view overnight or weekend stays in detention
as a good "dose" of discipline, in lieu of personally-imposed parental
punishment. The parent hopes that the shock of a temporary lock-up will
teach the child a lesson he will never forget. Unfortunately, it may also be
a lesson from which he will not easily recover. The child, especially if he is
a "first offender," may fall victim to older, bigger, and more experienced
juvenile offenders.56
Because the foregoing motives are common, proposed Substitute
House Bill 460 would increase the likelihood that the court will not release
the child. It would be more consistent with the purposes and realities of
detention not to let parents refuse to agree to care for their child. It is
illogical to punish the child with continued confinement in a detention
setting merely because the parents refuse to accept their responsibilities.
If the proposed provision to detain children for parental refusal to
guarantee return is retained, the bill should be amended to provide that a
child detained for parental refusal must be treated as a dependent child
55. Id.
56. See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra. Asked in an interview whether a child could
be taught a lesson by a few nights injail, Milton G. Rector, President of the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency, replied:
No child deserves that kind of lesson. Being in jail is a traumatizing experience for
youngsters. Some are brutalized. Some hurt themselves. All are further alienated from
their parents. Just recently, a case came across my desk of a 17-year old college freshman,
who was arrested because police found marijuana in his dormitory room. The boy's father
let the police keep him injail overnight. When he got therein the morning, the boy's nose was
broken and both his eyes blackened-the result of a fight begun when older, tougher
prisoners tried to gang-rape the younger boys.
Robinson, supra note 6. at 167-68.
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(one who lacks proper parental supervision) and held in a less restrictive
shelter care facility or foster home setting. 7
Substitute House Bill 460 offers no solution to the problems of
preventive detention. The bill would continue current practices and
expand detention to include children whose parents decline to vouch for
their child's future return to court. Adoption of this provision seems
certain to increase the number ofjuveniles detained and worsen the already
unsatisfactory, overcrowded, conditions of confinement.
D. Interim Status Standards Proposed by the Institute of
Judicial Administration-American Bar Association Joint
Commission
The Institute of Judicial Administration-American Bar Association
Joint Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards [IJA-ABA Commission]
has proposed interim status standards to govern the actions of arresting
officers, intake officers, and juvenile court judges.58 The standards divide
57. See text accompanying notes 96-100 supra.
58. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, STANDARDS 5.6 (police), 6.6 (juvenile facility intake
officials), 7.7 (juvenile court). The other standards are keyed to the standard for intake officer.
6.6 Guidelines for status decision.
A. Mandatory release. The intake official should release the accused juvenile unless
the juvenile;
1. is charged with a crime of violence which in the case of an adult would be
punishable by a sentence of one year or more, and which if proven is likely to result in
commitment to a security institution, andone or more of the folloAingadditional factors
is present:
a. the crime charged is one of first or second degree murder
b. the juvenile is currently in an interim status under the jurisdiction of the
court in a criminal case, or is on probation or parole under a prior adjudication. so
that detention by revocation of interim release, probation, or parole may be
appropriate;
c. the juvenile is an escapee from an institution or other placement facility to
which he or she was sentenced under a previous adjudication of criminal con-
duct:
d. thejuvenile has a demonstrable recent record of willful failureto appearat
juvenile proceedings, on the basis of which the official finds that no measure short of
detention can be imposed to reasonably ensure appearance. or
2. has been verified to be a fugitive from anotherjurisdiction, an official ofwhich
has formally requested that the juvenile be placed in detention.
B. Mandatory detention. A juvenile who is excluded from mandatory release under
subsection A. isnotpro tanto, tobeautomaticallydetained. No category ofalleged conduct
or background in and of itself may justify a failure to exercise discretion to release.
C. Discretionary situations.
1. Release vs. detention. In every situation in which the release of an arrested
juvenile is not mandatory, the intake official should first consider and determine whether
the juvenile qualifies for an available diversion program, orwhetherany form ofcontrol
short of detention is available to reasonably reduce the risk of flight or misconduct. If
no such measure will suffice, the official should explicitly state in writing the reasons for
rejecting each of these forms of release.
2. Unconditional vs. conditional or supervised release. In order to minimize the
imposition of release conditions on persons who would appear in court without them.
and present no substantial risk in the interim, each jurisdiction should develop guidelines
for the use of various forms of release based upon the resources and programsavailable.
and analysis of the effectiveness of each form of release.
3. Secure vs. nonsecure detention. Whenever an intake official determines that
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children accused of delinquency into two groups: (1) those whose release is
mandatory, absent special circumstances, because the charged offense
would, for an adult, be punishable by a sentence of less than one year; and
(2) those whose release is discretionary because the charged offense would,
for an adult, be punishable by a year or more in a secured facility.
The proposed standards supply laudably strict and definite criteria for
the exercise of discretion to detain, and thus represent a significant
improvement over both existing Ohio law and pending legislation. The
classification of juvenile detainees by the nature of the offense charged is,
however, vulnerable to criticism. The legislative distinction between
crimes punishable by less than one year in prison (ordinarily misdemea-
nors)59 and crimes punishable by one year or more (ordinarily felonies)6" is
often arbitrary and not reflective of the social significance of the offense.
In Ohio, for example, such serious offenses as assault, negligent
homicide, arson and sexual imposition are all chargeable as misdemea-
nors.6' To codify the felony-misdemeanor distinction would seem no
more desirable than to continue to allow subjective judicial discretion
based upon essentially the same distinction. Moreover, because many
juveniles would fall within the standards' allowance of discretionary
detention, their adoption would reduce but not eliminate the problems
traditionally associated with interim detention.
The recommendations are a compromise, completely satisfactory
neither to those who would abolish predisposition detention nor to those
who support completely discretionary detention powers for courts. The
IJA-ABA Commission saw its standard as "a reasonable middle ground,
characterized by a distinct preference for release, a permissible but
minimal category of detainees, and a requirement of candor in identifying
those who may be detained. 62
III. BAIL: PANDORA'S Box OR PANACEA?
One possible solution to the problem of arbitrary predisposition
detention of children is to provide juveniles with a right to bail. Release
would routinely be guaranteed as long as the terms and conditions of the
detention is the appropriate interim status, secure detention may be selected only if clear
and convincing evidence indicates the probability of serious physical injury to others, or
serious probability of flight to avoid appearance in court. Absent such evidence, the
accused should be placed in an appropriate form of nonsecure detention, with a foster
home to be preferred over other alternatives.
Id. STANDARD 6.6.
59. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.02(F) (Page 1975).
60. See, e.g., id. § 2901.02(E).
61. Id. §§ 2903.13 (assault), 2903.05 (B) (negligent homicide), 2902.03 (arson), 2907.06 (sexual
imposition).
62. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATus, supra note 1, at 79.
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bail were met. However, money bail, which has often proved unworkable
for adults,63 presents even greater problems for juveniles.64
For present purposes the subject ofjuvenile bail will be approached as
though its availability were within legislative discretion, circumscribed
only by general principles of due process and equal protection. The
constitutional question whether the right to bail is guaranteed by the
eighth amendment to every adult accused of a criminal offense remains
unanswered by the Supreme Court;65 the derivative question, whether
juveniles enjoy a federal constitutional right to bail, is beyond the scope of
this discussion.66
The theory of bail in the adult criminal system is that "the forfeiture of
one's goods will [serve as] an effective deterrent of the temptation to break
the conditions of one's release. 67 Bail is properly employed only "to
release the accused with assurance that he will return at trial";68 it may not
be denied merely because the accused is likely to flee, 69 nor set excessively
high to achieve prophylactic or preventive detention. In practice, the
bail system is seriously flawed:
Accused persons . . .are forced to spend the interval between arrest and
trial in jail ...because they cannot pay the bondsman's premium, or put
up ...collateral. They lose theirjobs. . . .Their chances for acquittal
are lowered ...
63. See, e.g., D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 6, at 9-21.
64. See authorities cited in IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIm STATUS, supra note 1, at 64.
65. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
66. In Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960), a federal district court recognized an
eighth amendment right to bail and declared that this federal constitutional right could not be withheld
from ajuvenile merely because delinquent behavior is technically noncriminal. The court stated: The
ultimate test is not whether the proceedings are denominated criminal or civil, but what the outcome
may be. If as a result of an infraction of law, the proceedings may result in depriving a person of his
liberty, the protection of the bill of rights is applicable." Id. at 486.
As one commentator has pointed out,
the ambiguous language of the excessive bail clause lends itself to at least three
interpretations, and a number of controversies. First, in a number of state criminal cases, it
has been held that "excessive bailr language, in itself, does not establish a right to bail. A
second group of cases, on the other hand, suggest that such a clause infers that bail cannot be
excessive in amount in cases where the court sets bail. How ever, if there are no statutory
provisions or restrictions, the court has the discretion to deny bail altogether. A thirdgroup
holds or suggests that the excessive bail clause necessarily implies a constitutional right to
bail. A problem with this last approach, as pointed out by Professor Caleb Foote, is that the
precise scope of the implied right is relatively undefined and this creates yet nnother issue.
Until these inconsistencies concerning the interpretations of the excessive bail clause are
settled, the language of the Eighth Amendment lends little support for the argument that
juveniles should be granted the right to bail.
Hill, The Constitutional Controversy of a Juvenile's Right to Bail in Juvenile Preadjudkcatlon
Proceedings, I HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 215, 215-16 (1974) (footnotes omitted). See also Foote, The
Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1965); Note, Right to Ballfor Juveniles,
48 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 99 (1971); Note, The Right to Bail and the Pre-"Trial" Detention of Juve-
niles Accused of "Crime", 18 VAND. L. REV. 2096 (1965).
67. Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197 (1960).
68. D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 6, at 8.
69. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
70. Id.
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Courts set bail for most defendants on the basis of their alleged crimes
and their records. Almost totally ignored are those ties to the community
that determine the likelihood of appearing at trial.
. . . [B]y relying on money [the present system of bail] jails too many
of the poor; it also protects too little against the dangerous.7'
Although attempts have been made to remedy some of these problems
with legislative reform and new court rules72 the most critical defect of the
bail system persists: A money-oriented system of pretrial release is unfair
to the poor. As Professor Foote has noted, "Compared with other due
process problems which have arisen in recent years, bail presents
differences in the treatment of the poor which are more pervasive and
pernicious."
73
Within this decade the Supreme Court has struck down, as violative
of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection, state
sentencing procedures that effectively imposed incarceration on indigent
individuals because of their financial inability to pay the alternative fine.
74
In 1977, in Pugh v. Rainwater," the Fifth Circuit found that Florida's
pretrial release system operated to deny equal protection to indigents
because it failed to incorporate a presumption against money bail. Very
recently the court en banc vacated the panel's earlier decision, five to four,
holding that a presumption against a money bond is not constitutionally
mandated.76
Despite serious practical, and perhaps constitutional, defects of bail
in the adult criminal justice system, debate continues over whether
juveniles already possess, or should be given, a right to bail.77  The
traditional view is that because allegations of delinquency are not
allegations of criminal conduct, any existing constitutional or statutory
right to bail for criminal offenses does not extend to delinquent juveniles."
In State ex rel. Peaks v. Allaman,79 an Ohio trial court determined
that reference by the Ohio Constitution to "bailable offenses" applied only
to conduct forbidden by the criminal code. Because the code then in effect
provided that children were not to be classified as criminal by reason of
conviction for delinquent acts, the Allaman court reasoned that allegedly
71. D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 6, at 110.
72. E.g., Bail Reform Act § 3(a), (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966)); FLA. R. CRII. P. 3.130;
OHIo R. CRIm. 46.
73. Foote, supra note 66, at 963.
74. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
75. 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977).
76. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978).
77. See authorities cited at note 65 supra; authorities cited in IJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM
STATuS, supra note 1, at 64-65.
78. See, e.g., A.N.E. v. State, 156 So. 2d 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State ex. reL. Peaks v.
Allaman, 51 Ohio Op. 321, 115 N.E.2d 849 (Montgomery County 1952); R. v. Whitner, 30 Utah 206,
515 P.2d 617 (1973).
79. 51 Ohio Op. 321, 115 N.E.2d 849 (Montgomery County 1952).
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delinquent children were not entitled to bail under the Ohio Constitution.80
In State v. Franklin,"1 however, the Louisiana Supreme Court con-
strued language in the Louisiana Constitution82 that was virtually
identical to that of the Ohio Constitution to give bail rights to all persons,
juvenile as well as adult. The Franklin court rejected the criminal-
noncriminal distinction sub silentio and ruled that juvenile courts "were
established with the view of showing more consideration to the juvenile
and were not designed to deprive him of his constitutional rights. "
8 3
Several courts, skirting the constitutional issue, have found that
statutory provisions for release of juveniles pending final disposition
satisfactorily perform the functions of adult bail.84 In Fuivood v. Stone 5
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a writ of habeas
corpus granted by the district court to a sixteen-year old youth detained
without bail on charges of robbery and assault. The appellate court held
that the District of Columbia juvenile detention statutes,86 if faithfully
observed in practice are "an adequate substitute for bail. 8 7 The Fuivood
rationale merely reopens inquiry into interim detention criteria;" it fails to
80. Id. at 323, 115 N.E.2d at 851.
81. 202 La. 439, 12 So. 2d 211 (1943).
82.
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines'imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted. All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except the folowing:
First, persons charged with capital offense where the proof is evident or the presumption
great; second, persons convicted of felonies, provided that where a minimum sentence of less
than three years at hard labor is actually imposed, bail shall be allowed pending appeal and
until final judgment.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
83. 202La.439,443, 12 So. 2d 211,213 (1943).
84. United States exreL Burtonv. Coughlin,463 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1972); Fulwood v. Stone. 394
F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969), rel"d on other
grounds, 442 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1971); Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971); In re Castro. 243 Cal.
App. 2d 402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966).
85. 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
86.
(a) When Prn officer takes a child into custody, he shall, unless it is impracticable or has
been otherwise ordered by the court, accept the written promise of the parent, guardian, or
custodian to bring the child to the court at time fixed. Thereupon, the child may be released
in the custody of a parent, guardian, or custodian. If not so released, the child shall be placed
in the custody of a probation officer or other person designated by the court, or taken
immediately to the court or to a place of detention provided by the Board of Commissioners
of the District of Columbia or its authorized representative, and the officer taking him shall
immediately notify the court and shall file a petition when directed to do so by the court.
(b) A child whose custody has been assumed by the court may, pending final
disposition of the case, be released by the court in the custody of a parent, guardian, or
custodian, or of a probation officer or other person appointed by the court, to be brought
before the court at the time designated. When not released as herein provided, the child.
pending the hearing of the case, shall be detained in a place of detention provided by the
Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, or its authorized representative, subject
to further order of the court.
77 Stat. 588 (1963) (current version at D.C. CoDE § 16-2311 (1973)).
87. 394 F.2d at 943.
88. See text accompanying notes 18-62 supra.
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answer the criticism that such statutes allow arbitrary and unbridled
discretion to detain juveniles.
Proponents of juvenile bail argue that, for all its defects, bail would
sharply curtail the arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion and guarantee
every juvenile the right to predisposition release. Opponents point to the
special obstacles that bail would encounter in the juvenile context.
Because juveniles ordinarily do not support themselves, a money bail
system would necessarily rely on the financial means of parents or
guardians.89  This dependency might present serious problems of
unfairness for poor families, or lead to conflicts of interest when the parent
or guardian has filed the charges or acquiesced in the filing.9" As an
alternative, it has been suggested that under a juvenile money bail system
the juvenile be allowed to post his or her own funds from personal
savings.9' This approach would serve to assure the future appearance of
the child, who would then have a personal stake in showing up for
hearings, and would avoid financial dependence on others. One problem
is that juveniles who come into contact with the law tend to lack resources.
Another is that because contracts entered into by minors are generally
voidable,"" bail bonds posted by juveniles would not be binding.
Common-law voidability could, however, be altered by statute.93
More fundamentally, the use of juvenile bail is arguably contrary to
the purposes of the juvenile justice system. The aspect of bail that most
appeals to reformers of the juvenile justice system, the absolute right to
release, is a major point of controversy. Critics of juvenile bail point out
that the goal of the juvenile justice system is to act in the best interest of the
child. In their view that goal would be thwarted if the courts were required
to grant absolute release even to those children who might be returned to
an environment that threatens immediate harm to their safety. Professor
Paulsen has argued that:
[B]ail ought not be a matter of right in a juvenile case, not because the
proceedings are civil rather than criminal in character but, more
importantly, because a child in trouble may need care immediately and that
care is not provided by a simple release from custody. Discharge to parents
will not be wise in every case because the parents may be the source of a
child's difficulty. 94
89. See Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
90. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
91. Wald, supra note 20, at 132.
92. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 6 (1963). The Alaska Supreme Court rejected
money bail for juveniles, assuring that
the present system would be practically unsuitable as a device for securing the child's future
appearance before a court, and would not necessarily result in th- child's release. Because
contracts entered into by minors have been held to be voidable, bail bondsmen surely would
be unwilling to deal directly with the child providing a bail bond.
Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 52 (Alaska 1971).
93. See UA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUs, supra note 1, at 65.
94. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 552 (1957) (emphasis In
original) (footnotes omitted). See also UA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 1, at 64.
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The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice asserted in 1967 that "[r]elease as of right plainly may interfere with
the protection and care required in some cases." 95
This criticism of juvenile bail can be remedied. The power of the
juvenile court over children extends beyond adjudication and disposition
of delinquents. In Ohio the courts can act to protect the interests of
children who are homeless, destitute, or lacking proper care and support.96
The court can also act to protect children who are threatened with neglect
or abuse,97 by ordering temporary placement in facilities that serve the
child's best interest.98 Substitute House Bill 460 would merge the classes
of abused and neglected children into the category of dependent children,
eliminating the present distinction between children suffering willful
neglect and children lacking care and support without fault of parents or
guardians. Under the substitute bill a child who is allegedly dependent
"shall be held only in a shelter care program or a foster home"1°° pending
final disposition. Dependency procedures could be made compatible with
release as of right under ajuvenile bail system if the dependency standards
were sufficiently specific to preclude abuse through arbitrariness. It
should prove easier to define dependency standards narrowly than to
establish specific detention standards, because behavior prediction, a
primary concern for detention, is not normally at issue in dependency
actions.
The IJA-ABA Commission adoptecfa standard that expressly rejects
money bail for juveniles: "The use of bail bonds in any form as an
alternative interim status should be prohibited." 01 The Commission
concluded that
despite the advantages of alternative forms of money bail, all systems based
on posting collateral or promising to pay money as a condition of release
should be prohibited in the juvenile system. Bail inherently discriminates
against persons without sufficient funds. It may exacerbate family
problems when parents are forced to post their funds in order to gain release
of a child. Its availability might reduce the pressure for more meaningful
reform, and might . . . be used as asubstitutefor other forms of release.
02
The original draft of House Bill 460 provided for pretrial release of
juveniles on money bail.13 The provision was deleted from the substitute
bill.
95. PREsiDENT's TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 36.
96. OHto REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.04, 2151.23 (Page 1976).
97. Id. §§ 2151.03-.031.
98. Id. § 2151.312.
99. Sub. H.B. 460, 112th Gen. Ass. § 2151.22 (1978).
100. Id. § 2151.26(A).
101. UA-ABA STANDARDS, INTERIM STATUS, supra note 1, STANDARD 4.7.
102. Id. at 66.
103. H.B. 460, 112th Gen. Ass. § 2151.55(C) (1977).
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Despite its drawbacks, a system of guaranteed release could be a
workable alternative to current juvenile detention practices if it
incorporated nonmonetary conditions, as contemplated in the Bail
Reform Act of 1966104 and the Ohio Rules of Criminal ProcedureI t,' The
Bail Reform Act directs that the accused "shall . ..be ordered released
pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an
unsecured appearance bond . ..unless the [judicial] officer determines,
in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably
assure the appearance of the person as required.' 0 6 In that case thejudge
"shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above methods of release;
impose thefirst of the following conditions of release which will reasonably
assure the appearance of the person for trial . . .., Of the alternative
forms of release that follow, money bond is ranked third, after
"place[ment] in the custody of a designated person .. .agreeing to
supervise ' O'  the accused and "restrictions on the travel association, or
place of abode .. .during the period of release ... ."'0' The Ohio
rule, 10 like the Florida rule sustained on rehearing in Rainwater,' was
patterned on the Act but omits the Act's presumption against money bond
and its order of priority.
Although the general presumption of the Bail Reform Act against
money bail appears not to be required by the fourteenth amendment,"12 it
is desirable as a matter of social policy in the adult and juvenile justice
systems alike. The Act's articulation and ranking of alternative
conditions upon which release may be granted is equally salutory and
should be used to guide the search for improved juvenile interim detention
procedures.
104. Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3(a), (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966)).
105. Omo R. CRIM. P. 46.
106. Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3(a), (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1966)).
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id. § 3146(a)(1).
109. Id. § 3146(a)(2).
110. OHIo R. CRIM. P. 46.
111. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.130 (set forth in Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1198, 1193 n.1 I (Sth Cir.
1977)).
112. The question still persists, however, whether money bail may constitutionally be required as
a condition of release for indigents. The first Rainwater court had held "not that money bail may never
be imposed on an indigent defendant [but] that equal'protection stardards require a presumption
against money bail and in favor of those forms of release which do not conidition pretrial freedom on an
ability to pay." Pugh v. Rainwater, 557F.2d 1189, 1202 (5th Cir. 1977). On rehearing, the majority
stated that
imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious dicrimination and is not
constitutionally permissible. But we view the deprivation of liberty ofone who is accused but
not convicted of crime as presenting a question with broader effects and constitutional
implications than would appear from a rule stated solely for the protection of indigents.
572 F.2d 1053, 1055 (5th Cir. 1978). Two judges observed that "[t]he majority's position necessarily
leads to the conclusion that monetary bail for indigents is unconstitutional." Id. at 2230 (Clark and
Tjoflat, JJ., concurring specially).
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IV. A MODEL FOR INTERIM STATUS DECISIONS
This writer proposes to modify and integrate existing rules and
suggested standards for interim release to fashion a model that provides
more specific detention guidelines for the juvenile court system without
sacrificing essential flexibility. The first element of the model consists of
categorizing alleged delinquent offenders into those for whom detention is
permissible and those for whom it is not. The second element then
superimposes methods of conditional release for detainable juveniles and
methods of court supervision and control for children not subject to
detention. The model draws upon the structural scheme of the IJA-ABA
Commission's proposed standards for interim status,1 3 but employs
criteria for mandatory release that are less mechanical than the
misdemeanor-felony distinction, and expressly accords supervisory
discretion to the juvenile court even when the court would lack discretion
to detain. The proposed conditions for release and supervision are
familiar; they have long been available to the juvenile justice system and
are frequently used. The model would, however, specifically require the
courts and other juvenile authorities to grant release if, on the facts of a
given case, they could not justify its denial.
A. Criteria for Identification of Juveniles Subject to Detention
The model contemplates that no juvenile could be detained unless he:
(1) has failed to appear at a previous hearing before a court, without
reasonable cause; or
(2) poses a substantial risk of physical harm to himself or others, as
manifested by recent violent behavior or threats of violence.!1
The first criterion is narrower and more specific than the "risk of
absconding" criterion that has traditionally been invoked to justify
detention."5  It requires that the juvenile, to be detained, must actually
have failed to present himself in court in the past, without a reasonable
113. IJA-ABA STA.NDARDS, INTERIM.STATUS, supra note 1, STANDARDS 5.6, 6.6, & 7.7.
114. This criterion is analogous to the Ohio civil commitment standard:
"Mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by Court order" means a mentally ill
person who, because of his illness:
(1) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by evidence
of threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious self-inflicted bodily harm;
(2) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to others as manifested by evidence
of recent homicidal or other violent behavior or evidence of recent threats that place another
in reasonable fear of violent behavior and serious harm.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(B)(l)-(2) (Page 1977). Ohio amended its civil commitment
procedures as a response to the mandate of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), ajuvenile case whose broad
due process implications affected all persons outside the category of competent adults. Thus, it is
ironically appropriate that the law of mental disability should in turn contribute to greaterfairness in
the juvenile justice system.
115. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
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excuse. Present threats of flight, or past history as a runaway or truant
would not justify detention, although the model anticipates that such past
behavior would trigger close supervision by the court.
The second criterion is also more determinate than its traditional
counterpart, the vague and often abused "risk of harm" standard for
preventive detention. 1 6  Under the model, the court is not driven to
unsupportable conjecture. Detention is an option only when the child has
acted violently or expressly threatened violence in the recent 17 past.
B. Presumption in Favor of Unconditional Release
Under the model, when an alleged delinquent offender is brought by
the arresting officer to the detention facility, the intake officials have the
duty to release the child if he is not subject to detention under the foregoing
criteria. 8 Even if the child is subject to detention, the intake officer, in
deciding whether to detain the child until the court can hold a preliminary
hearing, I 9 would act under a presumption in favor of unconditional
release. Because the prehearing detention period is usually relatively
short, the terms of the model do not provide for discretion of the intake
officials to grant conditional release, but restrict the officials' options to
detention or unconditional release.
If the intake official's decision is to detain, when the child comes
before the court the model once again establishes a presumption in favor of
unconditional release. If the court concludes on the evidence that
unconditional release is inappropriate, it may not detain the child without
further considering whether release might be made under one or some
combination of six specified conditions.
C. Conditions of Release and Supervision
The model prescribes six conditions that the court may impose upon
the release of a detained juvenile. The release conditions are not ranked in
mandatory order120 but they are exhaustive and must all be considered.
The conditions may be employed singly or in combination, subject to the
requirement that the chosen method constitute the least restrictive
alternative12 1 possible to assure the child's appearance at a subsequent
adjudication hearing.
116. Id.
117. Although 'recent' is imprecise, it would seem preferable to all owjudicial flexibility over the
relevant time period to be used in evaluating the nature of the threat posed by the juvenile.
118. This feature of the model parallels STANDARD 7.7(B), TJA-ABA STANDARDS, INTEIINI
STATUS, supra note 1.
119. Proposed § 2151.17(B) of Sub. H.B. 460 formalizes the "informal detention hearing [to be)
held not later than 72 hours after [placement] in detention" now required by Ohio law. Oto R.
CODE ANN. § 2151.314 (Page 1976).
120. E-g., Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3(a), (codiflied at 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1966)). See note 107
and accompanying text supra.
121. H.B. 460 required use of the least restrictive method of treatment forjuveniles adjudicated
[Vol. 39:306
INTERIM DETENTION
The conditions 122 are:
(1) release into custody of a parent or other supervising adult oragency;
(2) release into custody of a supervising individual or agency with the
further restriction that the supervisor or representative must
accompany the child when he leaves the supervisors premises except
to work or attend school (other exceptions in the court's discretion);
(3) individualized hours of curfew set by the court;
(4) regular attendance at specified programs of academic, health or
recreational instruction;
(5) periodic reporting to a designated agent of the court;
(6) restricted association with specified persons or visitation to specified
places.
The model requires the judge to consider the foregoing conditions in
any case in which he does not grant unconditional release. If the judge
then determines that the characteristics of the child and his environment
are incompatible with even a heavily-conditioned release, he may impose
interim detention.
23
The same six conditions are available to the court in support of its
supervisory discretion to assure the appearance of allegedly delinquent
offenders who are not subject to detention. In practice, the court's
supervisory control of a juvenile not subject to detention may often prove
indistinguishable from its control of a juvenile, who, although subject to
detention, is granted a conditional release. Moreover, the model would
allow courts to place juveniles who are simultaneously delinquent and
dependent, but not subject to detention, into an appropriate shelter care or
foster home setting.
124
delinquent or unruly, the substitute bill imposes that requirement on adjudications of dependency,
delinquency, and unruliness. H.B. 460, 112th Ohio Gen. Ass. § 2151.02(G) (1977); Sub. H.B. 460,
112th Ohio Gerf. Ass. §2151.27(L) (1978). The Ohio legislators are thus already aware of the issue as it
relates to disposition and may be willing to extend the least restrictive method requirement to interim
procedures as well.
Consideration of the least restrictive alternative doctrine had arisen in the context of physical
conditions and administrative restrictions of jails and prisons. Hamiltonv. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182
(E.D. Ark. 1971). The issue has also been raised with respect to excessive security for mental patients:
[T]he principle of the least restrictive alternative consistent with the legitimate purposes
of a commitment inheres in the very nature of civil commitment, which entails an
extraordinary deprivation of liberty . . . .A statute sanctioning such a drasticcurtailment
of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly, construed in order to avoid
deprivation without due process of law.
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617,623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657
(D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1966).
The foregoing has led one commentator to generalize that "all restrictions on detainees must be
reasonably related to the state purpose of holding them until trial; the means used must be no more
restrictive than is required to accomplish that limited purpose." Note, Constitutional Limitations on
the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE LJ. 941, 950 (1970).
122. The conditions are either embedded in the existing formal procedures and informal
practices of the juvenile and adultjustice systems or, in the case of specially set curfews, seem intuitively
to fall within the broad powers of the juvenile courts acting as parens patrae.
123. As noted at text accompanying note 114 supra, only those juveniles who have failed to
appear at a previous hearing or who pose a substantial risk of physical harm to themselves or others
are subject to detention.
124. See text accompanying notes 96-100 supra.
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D. Informational Needs of the Model
The ultimate success of the proposed model depends on adequate
information at two levels. First, and most importantly, a rational judicial
decision concerning detention requires rapid access to the history and
characteristics of the individual child in the context of his family, school,
and community.' 25 Second, data should be gathered and analyzed to
assess the effectiveness of the model and to suggest appropriate
modifications. The economic costs of an effective information system are
significant but should be balanced against the benefits, both social and
economic, of holding only the small number ofjuveniles for whom interim
detention is truly necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
Children who enter the juvenile justice system should not be subjected
to arbitrary decisions under vague standards for interim release. Nor
should they suffer oppressive and unfair conditions of money bail.
Release of juveniles awaiting final disposition should be governed by a
system that is not oriented to the posting of financial security and that
invokes the least restrictive alternative required to assure the appearance
of the individual child at subsequent adjudication proceedings.
The proposed model forbids detention of children who do not
demonstrably threaten the physical safety of themselves or others and are
not known to have been inexcusably absent from prior court hearings,
The model directs that even the relatively restricted category of allegedly
delinquent juveniles subject to detention may not be held unless the court
has considered and rejected the alternatives of unconditional release and
release under six specified conditions. The model further provides that
the court may attempt to assure the future appearance of juveniles not
subject to detention by imposing the least onerous alternative selected
from among the same six conditions of supervision. In sum, the model is
sufficiently specific to avoid unjustifiable detention, yet sufficiently flexible
to preserve the power and discretion that the juvenile courts require to
protect the individual child, the family, and the larger society.
125. See, e.g., Note, The Right to Bail and the Pre-"Trial" Detention of Juveniles Accused of
"Crime", 18 VAND. L. REV. 2096, 2107-09 (1965) (proposing a screening program). In Ohio, the
problem of information gathering for adult criminal pretrial release purposes has been attacked
primarily through the use of "pretrial release" or "bail" programs and projects. See Howard &
Pettigrew, ROR Program in a University City, 58 A.B.A.J. 363 (1972).
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